Abstract
BICC -structural change and the development of management accounting, c.1945-c.1960 1 Introduction
According to Chandler (1962 Chandler ( , 1977 Chandler ( and 1990 , the scale and scope of business activity is likely to have implications for the design of management information systems. In particular, the emergence of large-scale business, ultimately leading to the development of the multi-divisional business form, created a demand for new forms of accounting. As managerial structures developed in response to strategic changes, they themselves necessitated changes in the accounting system, developments which ultimately led to a distinction being made between, on the one hand, management accounting and, on the other, financial accounting. Although the essence of Chandler's transaction costs approach was accepted by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) , they reversed his line of causation, arguing that developments in management accounting, rather than having been a consequence of the emergence of large-scale businesses, "may have facilitated the growth of large-scale firms " (1987: 21) .
The key developments in management accounting which have been traditionally associated with the rise of large, multi-divisional businesses are methods such as budgetary control and standard costing. Writing nearly twenty years ago, Drury (1985: 782) commented that although such techniques were developed in the early twentieth century, they did not find "widespread practical application" in Britain until the 1950s. Writing ten years later, Scapens (1995: 16-17) argued that responsibility accounting, made possible by standard costing and budgetary control, only developed rapidly in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s. While recent literature-based and archival-based research (Boyns, 1998a,b; Boyns et al, 2000) has begun to suggest that these techniques were used by some British companies somewhat earlier than previously thought, it is still generally accepted that the widespread utilisation of budgetary control and standard costs in Britain dates from the 1950s and 1960s. This is perhaps not altogether surprising since this was the period in which the term 'management accounting' began to enter the language of British accountancy and largely coincided with the introduction of the concept of 'divisions' into British firms.
In the light of these views and developments, it was considered that the examination of the archives of a large company which developed the multi-divisional form during the 1950s and 1960s might provide interesting insights into the events of those decades. The electric cable manufacturer, British Insulated Callender's Cables Ltd. (BICC), was chosen for this study, in part because the archives of one of its major constituent companies had already been the subject of scrutiny by the author. Furthermore, the company seemed to ideally fit the bill: it was large and adopted divisionalisation during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, in 1955, BICC employed 39,000 workers, making it the twentieth largest employer in the UK (Jeremy, 1998: 571-2) , and in 1969-70 it was the sixteenth largest British manufacturing company with a turnover of £404 million (Channon, 1973: 52-63) . Furthermore, during the period between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, BICC supposedly developed from "essentially a holding company" to a multi-divisional company, with divisions based on products (Channon, 1973: 52) . This paper thus examines the major changes that occurred in BICC's organisational structure in the early 1950s and examines how these were related to changes in the company's accounting system, for it was in the first half of the 1950s (see Table 1 ) that the company began to develop the first signs of a divisionalised structure and to utilise budgetary control, 'management accounts' and standard costs. The story revealed below not only throws light on the link between changes in organisational structure and accounting change, but also on two other issues: the role played by management consultants in the development of the multi-divisional form; and issues related to corporate governance.
The main elements of the BICC story related below have been constructed from a series of company documents detailing organisational changes and the evidence contained in two series of minute books, one relating to the company's board of directors and the other to that of the 'management' committee 1 set up to advise the chief executive officer from 1950. Of the two sets of minutes, it is the latter which has proved most informative, not least because the minutes of the debates are reasonably full. The lack of any supporting committee papers, however, has meant that some of the questions to which it would have been nice to have had answers can not be addressed due to the limitations of the surviving material. The analysis provided in this paper is, therefore, incomplete and, in relation to the details of the management information system, especially deficient in detail since only a few accounting documents have survived, and those that do relate only to one subsidiary at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we examine the key changes in the organisational structure of BICC between 1945 and c.1960 ; in section three our attention focuses on the development of BICC's management information systems; in section four we consider some aspects of corporate governance; and our conclusions are presented in the final section. (Morgan, 1985: p.19) . In an interview given in 1982, however, McFadzean also indicated that G.H. Nisbett, the managing director during the 1930s 2 , had also played an important role, being convinced in the late 1930s of the need for BIC to become larger. Although Nisbett had been opposed to McFadzean's appointment in 1932, on the grounds that companies did not need accountants (LIV, BICC IX/2/4 -transcript of taped interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.8), they eventually became friends and Nisbett used to set McFadzean the task of working out the financial implications of possible amalgamations. Although these did not come to anything, they sowed a seed which was to take root when, according to McFadzean, he "became serious in his own mind and had to achieve something" (LIV, BICC IX/2/4 -transcript of taped interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.8) . That something, was the merger between BIC and Callender's, which he worked on between 1942 and 1945 and which resulted in the formation of BICC in June 1945.
During the first twenty or so years of its existence from 1945, BICC's senior management was concerned with two key issues: first, effectively merging together productive operations and establishing an organisational structure appropriate for the merged entity; and second, the development of BICC as a major international company. At the time of its formation, BICC had an issued share capital of £11.2 million 3 and employed 40,000 workers, approximately one-half of whom would appear to have been employed in the subsidiary companies, it being reported in 1951 that the parent company, including the construction group, employed only 20,500 (LIV BICC V/7/121, BICC Ltd., Organisation -Notes, 1951) . 4 . The four main works previously operated by BIC and Callender's Cables, those at Prescot, Helsby, Leigh (Lancashire) and Erith, formed the core of the parent company's operations. The BICC Group, however, comprised this core together with the numerous subsidiaries, wholly or partly owned by BICC, and which retained their separate legal identities. Since there is a lack of archival information relating to many of the company's subsidiaries, the emphasis of this paper will be on developments at the parent company. However, where relevant information on subsidiaries is available, such as that for W.T. Glover & Co. Ltd., which played a key role as a test-bed for the developments subsequently introduced within the parent company, this will be included in the analysis.
As a result of the actions of both Roger and McFadzean, who took over from the former as Chairman in June 1954, BICC developed from being a mainly British concern to a truly international one. According to McFadzean's obituarist, from a "very early stage in the life of BICC, McFadzean was responsible for its development from a medium-sized cable company to a group with operations across the globe. McFadzean drove the company abroad through a series of partnerships and co-operative deals. "Our great surge forward", as he described it, was intended to extend the company's reach without exposing it to undue risk" (Obituary, The Times, 17 January 1996, LIV, BICC IX/2/4). Thus, in the early 1950s overseas expansion, in conjunction with foreign nationals, occurred in India, Canada, Rhodesia and New Zealand (BB, BICC MDC min. 433/54, 22 Dec. 1954) . As a result of this expansion, in 1961 the company comprised 9 divisions and 44 subsidiary companies, with 41,000 employees and manufacturing facilities in 11 countries (LIV, BICC IX/3/4, Morgan, History, Parts 3A, ch. 4, p. 3) . By January 1963 employment had grown to over 48,000 employees in 16 countries (McFadzean, 1966: 287) .
Before a successful overseas expansion could be achieved, however, there were matters much closer to home which had to be sorted out. The merger of BIC and Callender's brought together two old-established firms with somewhat different organisational structures and possibly different cultures. The development of both companies had been adversely affected by the Second World War. Thus in the first five to ten years after the company's formation, BICC's management faced the twin problems of overcoming the legacies of war and of adopting an organisational structure not only appropriate to the newly merged business but also capable of enabling future expansion, especially overseas (BB, BICC MDC min. 433/54, 22 Dec. 1954) . During the first ten years or so after the completion of the merger, the rationalisation of production and the development of an efficient organisational structure went hand in hand.
The development of the organisational structure
At the outset, the organisational structure of BICC was based on functional lines. Following the pattern established at BIC before the merger, below the chairman, the organisation comprised a number of 'executive managers' who were board members (see Figure 1) . Each was responsible for a sphere of operations across the whole company, either directly in relation to the parent company or indirectly, through positions on their boards, in relation to subsidiary companies. At the outset, in order to retain the skills and knowledge of the existing senior personnel within both of the constituent companies, some posts were shared. Over the next few years, however, many of the older individuals, having helped to oversee the transition to the new company, gradually retired from active involvement. Thus numerous changes of personnel and an evolution of the management structure are recorded during the late 1940s and early 1950s, as a younger generation emerged to take over the reins and the organisational structure was more clearly worked out. In some years, the chairman, Sir Alexander Roger, noted that because of the pace of change in relation to the organisational structure, no further changes were to take place, in order that prior changes could bed in. Having overseen the successful birth of BICC and the evolution of its functionally based organisation, Roger retired as chairman in June 1954, aged 75 years, and was replaced by McFadzean who, since 31 March 1950, had been operating as chief executive of the company. Until December 1954, McFadzean combined the roles of chairman and chief executive, when it was announced that he would become chairman and managing director. At this time, the organisational structure of the company was still very much based on the horizontal structure (see Figure 2) . A key development which followed 12 months after McFadzean took up the reins as chairman of the company was the move from a horizontal to a vertical organisational structure. In June 1955 the company issued a key document entitled "Reorganisation of Works based on Manufacturing Divisions" (LIV, BICC V/7/122). In the introduction to this document it stated that
The Company at present operates substantially with a horizontal type of organisation under which each function (Purchasing, sales, Engineering, Production, Financial and Secretarial) operates positively in the field assigned to it, over the whole of the Company's products, from the highest to the lowest level of operational activity. This type of organisation is well suited to a moderate size business, but it is not considered to be the most efficient for a large Company such as BICC with its wide diversity of specialised manufactured products and with Works located at considerable distances from one another and from administrative headquarters.
(LIV, BICC V/7/122, p.4)
As a result, the company had decided to introduce a divisionalised structure for its manufacturing works with "defined Line (or operational) and Central management responsibilities" (LIV, BICC V/7/122, p.4). That this was possibly not to be full divisionalisation is suggested by the reference to "largely self-contained divisions" contained in the reorganisation document, but the goal was clearly to improve efficiency by setting up a simple command structure and giving responsibility to divisions, where teams would focus on common objectives:
The breaking down of the Company's manufacturing activities into specialised divisions will create integrated teams of technical, production and selling personnel who, working in close proximity to one another towards a common objective, will become more efficient in their narrower fields of activity than is possible at present with the horizontal organisation in which effort and responsibility are less closely integrated.
As a result of the plans, which were to be implemented from 4 July 1955, the manufacturing activities of the parent company were to be organised into nine divisions based largely on the main works. 5 The two smaller works, Leigh and Erith, were to form the Rubber Cables and Power Cables divisions respectively, while the bigger works, at Prescot and Helsby, were to each comprise more than one division. Prescot thus housed the Wire Mill division, the Telephone Cables division, the Mineral Insulated Cables division and the Accessories division, while Helsby housed the Thermoplastic Cables division and Capacitor division (LIV, BICC V/7/122, pp.5-6). The nature of the change brought about in 1955 by the move to divisions can be seen from Figure 3 .
The nature of the divisionalisation introduced at BICC in July 1955 was clearly somewhat limited, not least because it only applied to the manufacturing operations of the parent company, and while technical, production, buying, selling and accounting functions were to be conducted within each division, responsibility for research and development was to be shared between the divisional chief engineer or technical officer and the company's central Research Organisation, under the direction of the Director of Research (LIV, BICC V/7/122). Nevertheless, that this was a serious attempt at divisionalisation rather than merely decentralisation is clear. According to Solomons, divisionalisation can be defined as decentralisation with "delegated profit responsibility" (1965: 3). The heads of the newly formed divisions at BICC were clearly to be made responsible for their performance, and accounting information was to be used both within divisions and by central management to monitor the operational efficiency of divisions. Indeed the significance of accounting information was indicated quite clearly within the document setting out the reorganisation plans: the organisation is designed primarily to enable Central Management to delegate a large part of its direct responsibility over operational activities. It would not be considered practicable to achieve this without having first in existence a system of Management Accounts to guide the Divisions and Works, and to enable Central management to exercise constant control over their conduct of affairs.
It is most fortunate that the Financial Organisation has made such excellent progress that they are now producing Management Accounts for all the nine proposed Divisions which are quite adequate at the present stage. These Accounts are of great importance to management; they focus attention promptly and continually on the things that matter, and measure performance so that positive corrective action can be taken before the information is historical.
(LIV, BICC V/7/122, p.7)
While the reorganisation document makes it clear that was to be one of the duties of a Works Manager to constantly review the operational performance of divisions through "Management Accounts", no details as to the nature of these 'management accounts' is provided. 6 However, under the duties of a Works Accountant, it is noted that he would be responsible for, amongst other things, the preparation and circulation of "Divisional Management Accounts", the preparation of "Operational Budgets for Central Management approval", and the operation of "Standard Costs for the products within the Works", as well as the preparation of all necessary cost control information and to watch the progress of the Works, especially in regard to budgets. The nature of the 'management accounts' and the method by which they were introduced within the company are examined in the next section.
The development of management accounting at BICC
The discussion that follows examines the emergence, during the early and mid-1950s, of what was referred to at BICC as 'management accounts'. This is not to argue that the company or its predecessors had never conducted activities which could be construed as costing or management accounting, indeed both BIC and Callender's Cables had some form of costing system which was used by management to help them manage the business prior to the formation of BICC. However, in the context of this paper it is considered that the development of the use of the term 'management accounts' in the 1950s within the company conveys important information. Firstly, the use of terminology which was only just entering the vocabulary of British accountants in the early 1950s is symptomatic of the fact that the company was aware of important developments in accounting at the time. Secondly, since the term is often linked to accounting developments such as budgetary control and standard costing, both of which have themselves been linked to the development of the multi-divisional business form, its use is indicative of the nature of the organisational changes being undertaken within BICC. Thus, in order to more fully understand the nature of the changes that were introduced at BICC in 1955, and the role played therein by accounting, it is important to determine the nature and timing of accounting developments and their relationship to the changes in organisational structure already outlined.
Due to the lack of survival of original accounting documents for the period covered by this paper, the story and analysis that follows is based almost wholly on the evidence contained in the surviving minute books of BICC's main board and its 'management' committee. In respect of the latter, in 1949 the company established a Chairman's Committee, which held its first meeting on 26 April, and continued to meet through to 17 April 1952. However, when McFadzean was appointed Chief Executive in March 1950, a new committee was established, namely the Chief Executive's Committee (hereafter CEC). Following the relinquishing by McFadzean of this title in favour of that of Managing Director in December 1954, the name of the committee was changed to Managing Director's Committee (hereafter MDC). Much of what follows is based on the evidence contained in the minutes of CEC/MDC.
The need
The move to divisionalisation of production at BICC in June 1955 necessitated the implementation of mechanisms by which central management could control and co-ordinate the various aspects of the business. In the introduction to the document setting out the details of the new structure, it was stated that "The successful operation of the Divisions and Works, and the Line management concerned, will be judged primarily by their profit performance within the limits set by Central Management having full regard to the overall interests of the Company" (LIV BICC, V/7/122, "Reorganisation of works based on manufacturing divisions", 10 June 1955, f.5). Key elements of the co-ordinating and controlling mechanisms were to be the use of management accounts and budgetary control.
The concern with overheads
Although little is known about the precise nature of the accounting and costing systems employed at BICC or any of its subsidiaries prior to 1950, Board minute books of the various companies making up the group do, however, reveal an understanding of the concept of break-even 7 , and a concern with overhead costs, load factors 8 , and the need to increase output to reduce unit costs in order to raise profitability. Throughout the period from the early days of 1950, the surviving minute books of BICC, both those of the main board and the chief executive's committee, show an over-riding concern with the issue of overheads. In October 1950 the board of BICC instigated an internal inquiry into the matter (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 67/51) and, in January 1951, McFadzean indicated that he wanted to receive estimates of overheads at least two months before the start of each year. The Overheads Investigation Committee submitted an interim report to the Chief Executive's Committee (CEC) on 28 February 1951 and it was noted, with some satisfaction, that the operations of the committee had already begun to stimulate a sense of "cost consciousness" in many parts of the organisation. The company was apparently seeking a minimum level of savings of £500,000 pa and it was noted that these could only be achieved by one or other of the following methods: rationalisation of production, improvements in processes and plant; reduction of scrap and losses in material utilisation; and reduction of overhead expenditure (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 67/51).
The reduction of overheads was a recurrent theme over the next few years. In May 1954, McFadzean considered it essential that overheads should be critically examined "having regard on the one hand to the diminishing trend of profit margins, which was likely to continue, and on the other to the outcome of the Monopoly Commission's report, which, when finally decided on, might well be the prelude to a period of most intense competition" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 111/54). 9 A new Overheads Investigation Committee, comprising Stone (deputy chairman), Handley (a non-executive director), Macmillan (chief accountant) and Thompson (company secretary), was established. The committee submitted its first report in April 1955, and exhibited particular concern with over-staffing and "it was agreed that generally the aim should be to provide staff to meet normal load not peak loads" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 92/55). Furthermore, while it was accepted that the higher levels of management had got the message about overheads, they now had a duty to ensure that this was communicated further down the line. At the beginning of 1955, a separate report on the profitable operation of Helsby from R.M. Fairfield, the newly appointed Director of Production and Engineering, and E. Bowyer, Manager (Production), indicated that either central and local establishment charges, of £320,000 and £460,000 respectively, must be reduced, or the works' capacity increased so that the overheads could be spread over a larger volume of output (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 7/55). It was decided to expand production, the expectation being that the loss of £200,000 for 1954 would be turned into a profit of £100,000 in 1955 (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 7/55).
The move to manufacturing divisions at BICC did not, therefore, occur in a vacuum and, in part, seems to have been designed, amongst other things, to help reduce overheads. The development of departmental accounts and the increasing use made of budgets, was also seen as part of the fight against overheads.
Departmental accounts and budgets
During the 1930s, if not before, the minutes of BIC regularly make reference to the 'Advertising Grant', i.e. the annual expenditure budgeted for advertising. In 1944, the BIC Board received statements setting out the extent to which anticipated savings had been realised in 1943 at the Prescot and Helsby works as a result of authorised capital expenditure on plant made in earlier periods (LIV BICC I/4/20, Main Board Minute Book no.20, min. 114/44). These isolated instances apart, there is no evidence of the use of budgets to control the business prior to the formation of BICC. By the early 1950s, however, the issue of budgetary control was raised, in the first instance, it would appear, by Dr. L.G. Brazier, Director of Research, at a meeting of the CEC in January 1951. Brazier broached the subject in a discussion on the issue of economy, particularly in relation to overheads, considering the full application of budgetary control to be "one of the most effective weapons available to the Management for this purpose" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 19/51). Since, in the same minute, it was also noted that "Mr. R. Macmillan [Financial Secretary] undertook to circulate the management budgets for 1951 for consideration at the next Meeting of the Managers" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 19/51), the implication is that experiments with budgets for control purposes were being undertaken, but possibly only to a limited extent.
The development of a more sophisticated use of budgets at BICC appears to have occurred alongside the development of departmental accounts, which received their first mention at the CEC meeting on 25 April 1951 (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 106/51). At the CEC meeting of 13 June 1951, departmental accounts relating to the whole of the year 1950 were considered (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 137/51), the nature and depth of the discussion recorded suggesting that such accounts were a new departure. Bowyer, Manager (Production), noted that "the manufacturing Accounts were studied by the Divisional Managers and were of considerable value to them as showing the annual outcome of the operations of their respective Divisions, and whilst they had no control over the allocations to Profit and Loss Accounts they did indicate to them the costs other than direct manufacturing which had to be recovered from the sale of the product. Both he and Mr. J.L. Harvey [Manager (Works Development)] did however stress the desirability of a further break-down of certain figures being made and the expenses directly attributable to Departments being provided at more frequent intervals" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 137/51). Mr. O.W. Minshull, Manager (Home Sales), and Mr. H.F. Akehurst, Manager (Export), reported that "the Accounts were of value to the Commercial Organisation not only in ensuring whether the profit margins were adequate but also, through the detailed information made available, permit of a constant review of the efficiency and justification for each Branch and activity" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 137/51).
The link between the development of departmental accounts and the increased use of budgets can clearly be seen from the recorded minutes. In discussing the company accounts for 1951, and having stressed the need for maximum use thereof to achieve the highest efficiency in production and throughout all organisations of the company, pleasure was expressed by members of the CEC in April 1952 at the fact that, in addition to quarterly budgets, quarterly accounts would be made available in future (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 85/52). In September 1952 the CEC minutes note that half-yearly departmental accounts for the first half of 1952 had been completed and were about to be circulated (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 143/52), and the accounts were scrutinised at the CEC meeting held on 24 September 1952. During 1952 and 1953, therefore, departmental accounts and budgets, apparently on a more and more frequent basis, became the norm. At the CEC meeting held on 8 July 1953, successive minutes relate to "planning of production", "review of departmental accounts", "departmental accounts" and "management budget". It is clear from the minute relating to the last item that actual expenditure was being considered against budgeted values (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 203/53). The role of budgets in relation to overheads becomes clear from the minutes of the Managing Director's Committee (MDC). 10 As part of the ongoing concern with controlling and, where possible, reducing overheads, a regularly minuted item discussed at the MDC is that of the selling and administration budget. At the MDC meeting held on 26 July 1956, for example, it was minuted that "The Chairman emphasised that the Budget was essentially a means available to the Overheads Committee and to managers themselves for controlling and reducing overheads; and he stressed the constant attention which must be given to this matter" (BB, BICC, MDC, min. 134/56).
Divisionalisation and the development of management accounts
The move to divisions in June 1955, while reinforcing the use of budgets also led to the demise of departmental accounts, which were rapidly replaced by monthly operating statements. On 21 September 1955, the company's accountant, Mr. Macmillan: said he felt that in view of the introduction of monthly operating statements, and the fact that it was possible to circulate these much more promptly than the Departmental Accounts, the latter should be abandoned, subject only to the provision of certain detailed costing figures to the Estimating and other Departments who require them; and this was agreed.
( for just over £1 million (Morgan, 1982: 85) .
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As was the norm within the BICC group, representatives of the parent company sat on Glover's Board. In February 1952 it is recorded that Glover's general manager, D.T. Hollingsworth, was to take up a post with the parent company and his position as general manager was to be taken up by R.M. Fairfield. Fairfield was an engineer who joined BICC from Callender's Cables (Morgan, 1982: 114) . On the formation of BICC he became Progress Manager responsible for the development and quality of impregnated paper and rubber insulated cables, and by May 1946 was described as the Process Manager of BICC, the process managers of the four main works all being responsible to him. On taking over as general manager of Glover's, Fairfield, as had Hollingsworth before him, made monthly reports to the company's Board. In his first report, however, Fairfield referred to 'divisions', a term which had never previously been used by his predecessor. While for the rest of 1952 and first few months of 1953, Fairfield's report contained more or less the same financial information as had been reported by Hollingsworth, in May 1953 there was a major shift with the introduction of "Management Accounts". Under this heading the relevant minute notes that "There were presented for the first time Operating Statements for the period 5 weeks to 31.3.53 and cumulative" (LIV BICC, I/11/87, Minute Book, vol. 1 (new series), f.191, 13/5/53). Five statements were presented: Estimated Company Operating Performance; Rubber Cable Division Production Performance Summary; Paper Cables Division Production Performance Summary; Thermo Plastic Cables Division Production Performance Summary; and Wire Drawing Department Production Performance Summary. Fairfield presented a brief resumé of the purpose of the statements and it is recorded that the company's chairman, Mr. Martin-Harvey "congratulated Mr. Fairfield on the tremendous thought and detail work which had gone into the preparation of the figures, commenting particularly on their usefulness, since they were in the hands of the Executives within 12 days of the end of each period" (LIV BICC, I/11/87, Minute Book, vol. 1 (new series), f.191, 13/5/53). It was determined that these documents should be included as a matter of routine in the agenda at each future Board meeting of Glover's.
Although no copies of the various operating statements from this period appear to have survived, the minutes do contain some evidence as to what they contained. The estimated company operating performance involved not only the presentation of monetary figures for profit, but also a figure expressing profits as a percentage return on sales. By July 1953 there was also reference to the "Working Capital Utilisation Factor" (LIV BICC, I/11/87, Minute Book, vol. 1 (new series), f.195, 29/7/53). 13 The minutes over the next few years reveal that the figures for profits, profit as a return on sales and the capital utilisation factor were monitored by the Board, and compared with budgeted figures. Thus, at Glover's Board meeting held on 29 January 1954, for example, it was noted that, based on the divisional and overall company budgets for 1954, budgeted performance was to generate a return on sales of 11.7 per cent, while the capital utilisation factor was budgeted at a value of 3 (LIV BICC, I/11/88, Minute Book, vol. 2 (new series), f.2, 29/1/54). When performance fell below the budgeted figures, as it did in the four weeks to 16 January 1954, explanations for the poor performance were supplied (LIV BICC, I/11/88, Minute Book, vol. 2 (new series), ff.6-7, 12/3/54). Although explanations are provided, there is no evidence during the 1950s that the annual budgeted figures for any year were ever revised in the light of actual outcomes.
It is clear from the above description of events at Glover's that the use of the term 'management accounts' occurred there somewhat earlier than it did within the BICC parent company itself. One possible explanation for this is that there were those within BICC who were interested in experimenting with new accounting ideas and concepts, but realised that it would make more sense to carry out such experiments in a small, self-contained segment of the company before applying it to a larger part.
14 It is feasible that Fairfield may have been put into Glover's specifically to do this, but it is equally possible that he was developing his own ideas which, when they had come to fruition, were then taken up by the parent company. Whichever of these suggestions, if either, might be true, Fairfield's role in the development of divisionalisation and the use of management accounts within BICC was clearly significant. In early 1955, shortly after McFadzean had taken over as chairman and managing director of BICC, Fairfield, who had been made Executive Director of Production and Engineering at BICC on 1 December 1954, paid a visit to the Western Electric Company in America. In an oral report made to the Managing Director's Committee on his return in March 1955, Fairfield noted the enormous size of AT&T (c.72,000 employees) and remarked that, over the last eight years, Western Electric had deliberately moved from a system of functional control to one of autonomous units at its main factories (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 66/55). Within a couple of months, together with Stone and Handley, Fairfield had compiled a report outlining a reorganisation of BICC's works based on autonomous manufacturing divisions (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 96/55). The scheme, as already noted above, after some discussion, both in the Managing Director's Committee and amongst senior and middle management generally, was implemented in June 1955.
While the introduction of 'management accounts' and divisionalisation at BICC went hand-in-hand, their adoption was clearly not simply a response to finding out how things were being done in America at Western Electric and then merely copying them, though learning of developments there clearly helped to legitimise similar changes at BICC. However, as has been pointed out, there is clear evidence of developments towards divisionalisation and the use of management accounts within the BICC organisation long before this visit. Fairfield clearly played a significant role, and so probably did McFadzean who, in the debate on the Fairfield, Stone and Handley report on divisionalisation in April 1955, stated that "he had believed for some time that the only way to develop the Company successfully was to move towards greater autonomy" (BB, BICC, CEC, min. 96/55).
Standard costs
While the surviving minute books of BICC and some of its subsidiaries reveal evidence of the use of budgets and management accounts, it has proved difficult to determine whether or not the company was making use of standard costs in the mid-1950s. Outside of the indications of the use to be made of standard costs in the document outlining the nature of the divisionalisation of June 1955 (see above), the only evidence relating to standard costs comes from Glover's. In February 1959 Associated Industrial Consultants (AIC) were called in, presumably by BICC, to carry out a survey of the Works Engineers Department at Glover's with a view to reducing costs (LIV BICC, I/11/88, minute book, vol. 2 (new series), min. 6/59). In October of the same year another firm of consultants, Urwick, Orr and Partners (UOP), were called in to advise on rationalisation of production of general and wiring cables, and of telephone cables, though the latter were subsequently dropped from the investigation. UOP presented two reports, one relating to the rationalisation of production and the other on the development of a unilateral selling arrangement, both of which were presented in January 1960. In the production report it was noted that while Work Study had been used successfully to reduce costs at most of the group units, effort had been concentrated on "establishing standards for pay incentives rather than on method improvement" (LIV BICC, V/14/67, UOP Report "Rationalisation of Production of General and Wiring Cables", f.37). It was noted that there was widespread scope for further standardisation of production methods and process techniques which, if carried out, "would achieve a greater degree of uniformity of standard costs and thus more reliable inter-unit comparisons" (LIV BICC, V/14/67, UOP Report "Rationalisation of Production of General and Wiring Cables", ff.37-8). Both reports were critical of certain aspects of the overall BICC organisation and, although it was recognised that cost accounting and control methods utilised by the parent company were superior to those of most member companies, BICC was urged to take steps to achieve greater uniformity in the presentation of information to management and the provision of the most suitable cost control procedure, thereby strengthening management control (LIV BICC, V/14/67, UOP Report "Rationalisation of Production of General and Wiring Cables", f.39).
In Glover's performance summary for 1970, it is noted that "The Standard Cost Masters used in costing cables have not been amended since 1959" (LIV BICC, V/14/67, "Performance Summary 1970", f.12). It is not altogether clear whether this implies that standard costs had not been used before that date, though one of the comments from the UOP report of January 1960 clearly suggests that they were in use at that time, but it is possible that they had been introduced following the investigation by AIC, or that new standards had been established at that time. By 1970, however, the introduction of metrification necessitated the introduction of new Cost Masters, even though Glover's argued that, under the out-of-date Cost Masters, the "application of overall revision variances has provided costs within acceptable tolerances" (LIV BICC, V/14/67, "Performance Summary 1970", f.12). Following metrification, however, it was stated that "improved techniques will be applied to record with more certainty the total cost of producing each cable at each process" and elsewhere it was noted that they would employ "new techniques of total process costing at each stage of manufacture to identify costs of manufacture with more certainty" (LIV BICC, V/14/67, "Performance Summary 1970", f.12). 
Who was responsible for the development of responsibility accounting at BICC?
The evidence examined above makes it clear that the person most directly responsible for introducing the use of 'management accounts' at BICC was R.M. Fairfield, who had pioneered their use at Glover's when general manager, and then, as the newly appointed Director of Production of Engineering at BICC, oversaw their introduction in connection with the adoption of manufacturing divisions in June/July 1955. In an interview given in 1982, McFadzean stated categorically that "a great deal of the credit for profit centres ought to be given to Ronnie Fairfield. He was really the instigator of that" (LIV, BICC IX/2/4, transcript of interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.27) . Given McFadzean's own background as an accountant, however, and his pre-eminent position as both chairman and managing director, there must be some suspicion that he was also behind the development, not least since he was a major supporter of greater autonomy for business units. Furthermore, McFadzean noted that he and Fairfield "virtually lived together" in London, the former residing at 87 Whitehall Court, and the latter at 66, and that "any evening we weren't doing anything we always dined together and talked together" (LIV, BICC IX/2/4, transcript of interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.27 ). It seems clear, then, that responsibility for the successful developments of 'management accounts' lay with two people: McFadzean as facilitator, and Fairfield as instigator and developer.
Fairfeld and McFadzean clearly had the necessary skills and intellectual abilities to develop new organisational structures and appropriate management information systems, and there is no evidence that the developments of the first half of the 1950 were influenced by outsiders. Indeed, the first mention of any management consultants being called in to assist the company does not occur until February 1957, when mention is made of a memo dated 17 th January 1957, which refers to Urwick, Orr and Partners being called in to advise as to the systems and paper work being used at Erith (BB, BICC MDC min. 60/57, 28 February 1957) .
16 , Many of the company's senior managers were far from convinced of the need to bring in outside consultants at this time (BB BICC, BM, min. 58/57), and it is instructive to note that all of the studies and investigations, whether into sales, production, overheads or aspects of costs, carried out prior to 1956 had been done in-house. Ad hoc committees, comprising various members of the company's senior management, would be formed to carry out such investigations as and when required. It would appear that this policy was related to other aspects of the company's development of its senior management and overall organisation.
From its commencement, the company had instigated an Education Scheme. This was mainly concerned with providing training and apprenticeships for young people under the age of 21, but also involved long-term training of individuals for management positions. By 1950, the company was spending £40,000 per annum on its Education Scheme, with approximately 500 persons covered. During 1950 the first post-war fiveyear programme was completed, it being announced that "38 graduates and 9 students have to date completed their courses and are now full-time and valuable members of our Organisation" (BICC, Directors' Report and Annual Accounts, 1950, p.19) . The existence of this scheme presumably explains the oft-avowed preference within BICC for favouring the promotion of people from within the company rather than bringing in outsiders. In 1950 attention was drawn to the fact that "every endeavour has been made to develop and up-grade men within the Company .." (LIV BICC, IX/1, "Organisation", 9 March 1950, f.1). In December 1954 it was noted that: "Whilst it would be wrong to preclude the appointment of men from outside the Group, it is the intention of the Board to give every prior consideration and encouragement to BICC Group personnel. It is therefore a matter of particular satisfaction to the Board that all men in the Senior Organisation now presented have won their spurs in the service of the BICC Group" (LIV BICC, IX/1, "Organisation", 1 December 1954, f.1). Even in December 1956, McFadzean continued to stress the active continuation of the "Company's declared policy ….. of upgrading men of promise" (LIV BICC, IX/1, "Organisation", December 1956, f.1). Thus, although BICC looked inward for managerial skills, rather than outward to management consultants in the early 1950s, this does not necessarily imply a weakness, but rather reflects the attention paid to in-house education and the fostering of managerial talent within the company.
Corporate Governance
It has been recently argued that, even at the end of the 1960s, the exit and voice aspects of corporate governance were ineffective in relation to British firms: "lack of liquidity prevented shareholder exit whilst dispersed shareholdings undermined the voice aspect of governance" (Toms and Wright, 2002: 106) . In terms of shareholding, BICC was typical: of its 21,000 stockholders in 1950/1, 42 per cent held under £200 of stock; 75 per cent under £500, while only 10 per cent held over £1,000 and only one per cent over £5,000 (BICC, Directors' Report and Accounts, 1950, pp.14-15) . Whilst the dispersed nature of shareholdings in BICC may have reduced the voice aspect of governance, it is possible that developments in the company's organisational structure may have compensated for this.
Compared to the position at its two main predecessor companies in the 1930s, BICC's board of directors in the 1950s comprised a much higher proportion of executive directors. In the 1930s, the boards of both BIC and Callender's Cables comprised almost exclusively non-executive directors or, as McFadzean later put it, "there was nothing but full-time outside directors" (LIV, BICC IX/2/4 -transcript of interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.27) . The transition to a board heavily populated by executive directors was gradual: in 1951, there were four executive and nine non-executive directors; by 1963, ten executive and four non-executive directors (McFadzean, 1966: 293-4) . This reflected McFadzean's belief that "the Board should be properly balanced by being two-thirds or so executive and one third non" (LIV, BICC IX/2/4 -transcript of interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.26) . While McFadzean later admitted that some mistakes had been made, for example, some people elevated to the Board who should not have been, and possibly having too many executive Board members, he was convinced that it had been right to put the managing directors of the big divisions on the Board (LIV, BICC IX/2/4 -transcript of interview, 15 Sept. 1982, p.27 ).
McFadzean's approach reflected his belief that improvements in profit performance could only be achieved by giving greater autonomy to the operating divisions. Thus, any initial tendency towards centralisation in the early years of BICC's existence, necessary to effect the integration of the former operations and personnel of BIC and Callender's Cables, quickly turned into, first, decentralisation of key aspects of the company's operations, and then divisionalisation. Some of these changes were put into effect before McFadzean became chairman or chief executive, but it seems likely that it was he who was the main guiding force behind such developments. The changes made up to Roger's retirement in 1954 were carried out with a number of motives in mind (LIV BICC IX/1, "Senior Organisation", 31 January 1953, f.1): to establish closer contacts between Directors and Managers, thereby facilitating, through combined understanding and effort, the achievement of maximum teamwork and efficiency; to enable full time directors to be relieved of all detailed work, so that executive directors could focus on high level administration and others on their major special tasks; to enable responsibility for day-to-day operations to be vested in Managers; and to enable the Chief Executive to be free to devote his time to "general overall co-ordination and planning and to specific problems at Home and Abroad". Although, in a joint statement at the end of January 1953, McFadzean and Roger could write that the present senior organisation of BICC is "by and large, in its final form" (LIV BICC, IX/1, "Senior Organisation", 31 January 1953, f.1), this position was soon to change, particularly after McFadzean replaced Roger as chairman of BICC. Throughout the 1950s, further organisational changes were designed to enable McFadzean and senior managers to be increasingly divorced from control of day-to-day operations so that they could concentrate on overall co-ordination and strategy. It does not seem, however, that this change was completed during the 1950s. Thus, even in the early 1960s, the directors would spend approximately a half of each board meeting "considering the comprehensive reports from our executives and the other half discussing broad developments and major policy" (McFadzean, 1966: 293) .
Thus, although the voice and exit aspects of corporate governance may not have been especially effective, it does seem that attempts were made within BICC to ensure that the shareholders interested were considered as high priority and that they achieved the maximum possible returns.
Conclusion
The above examination of the development of divisionalisation and the use of 'management accounts' at BICC during the 1950s has indicated that the two largely went hand-in-hand. The use of 'management accounts' was pioneered by Fairfield at Glover's, and then formed a key plank, under McFadzean, of the introduction of divisionalisation at the manufacturing plants controlled by the parent company. In many ways, therefore, organisational change and accounting change within BICC were symbiotic, though the prior existence of relevant techniques which could be utilised was obviously important, supporting the Chandlerian view of such developments. BICC's development of divisionalisation does not, however, entirely fit the picture normally painted of such developments in Britain. Following Channon's pioneering study, most later historians have accepted his story that divisionalisation and moves towards the formation of multi-divisional enterprises in Britain was brought about by the activities of management consultants, in particular American ones, most notably McKinsey's (Channon, 1973; Hannah, 1983: 152; Toms and Wright, 2002: 102, 104-5) . While subsequent changes at BICC in the 1960s may have been influenced by external consultants which began to be employed by the company from the late 1950s, all the evidence points to the fact that the developments detailed in this paper were introduced by individuals within the company without any outside assistance.
In respect to the issue of corporate governance, although the company's stock was widely spread, the emphasis of the organisational changes and the introduction of accounting systems of control based around responsibility accounting, suggest that the interests of shareholders were generally well-looked after by the management. However, at the present point in time, a lack of relevant data makes it difficult to judge the efficiency of the company during the 1950s so it is difficult to be categorical on this point. But clearly the company's senior management was motivated by the profit motive. Furthermore, it adopted and developed an organisational structure which aimed to generate improvements in efficiency, and developed business control systems by which to try to ensure that profits were maximised. and an unknown rapporteur for the 9 th Journée de l'histoire de la comptabilité et du management held at ParisDauphine university for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (grant ref. R000237946) for their financial support which made possible the archival research upon which this paper is founded. On the eve of the merger, BIC had an issued capital of £3 million and Callender's Cables £1,923,916 (Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, 1945) . The former was exchanged for £6 million of stock in BICC, and the latter for just under £3¼ million of stock.
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